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Jamesian epistemology formalised:
an explication of ‘The Will to Believe’
Famously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epis-
temic life.
There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion, — ways
entirely different, and yet ways about whose difference the theory of knowledge
seems hitherto to have shown very little concern. We must know the truth; and
we must avoid error, — these are our first and great commandments as would
be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical commandment
[...] Believe truth! Shun error! — these, we see, are two materially different
laws; and by choosing between them we may end by coloring differently our
whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and
the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the
avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance. (James, 1896,
Section VII)
In this paper, I give a formal account of James’ claim using the tools of epistemic utility
theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states — that is, full belief,
full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out
for graded doxastic states — that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus answers
a question left open in (Pettigrew, 2014). Konek (ta) gives a related treatment of imprecise
credences.
It is not entirely clear whether James intends, in ‘The Will to Believe’, to speak of beliefs
and disbeliefs or of credences. He certainly talks of “options” between “hypotheses”, which
suggests the choice between two categorical states — belief in one hypothesis or belief in the
other. But he also talks of different strengths of a “believing tendency” and suggests that
only a hypothesis with the “maximum of liveness” (presumably the maximum “believing
tendency”) counts as a belief (James, 1896, Section I). In any case, in this paper, we treat
both.
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1 Epistemic utility theory
According to epistemic utility theory, the rationality of a doxastic state is determined by
how conducive it is to obtaining epistemic utility. Thus, like utilitarianism in ethics and
other forms of consequentialism, it makes the good prior to the right; a doxastic state is epis-
temically right (or rational) if it conduces to what is epistemically good (to wit, epistemic
utility). Investigations in this area thus comprise two parts: first, we give an account of the
epistemic utility of the doxastic states in which we are interested; second, we state some con-
sequentialist principles, drawn from decision theory, that govern choices between different
options that are assigned different utilities depending on how the world is.
For instance, take Jim Joyce’s non-pragmatic vindication of the credal norm of proba-
bilism (Joyce, 1998). First, he gives an account of epistemic utility: credences have greater
epistemic utility the greater their accuracy. Second, he appeals to a decision-theoretic prin-
ciple: it is the principle of dominance, which says that if one option is better than another in
all situations — in the jargon, the former dominates the latter — then the latter is irrational.
Finally, he derives probabilism by showing that any credences that violate that norm are
accuracy dominated.
In this paper, we’ll attempt to reconstruct — perhaps better, explicate — William James’
claim concerning the two commandments of epistemology using the same notion of epis-
temic utility to which Joyce appeals. But we’ll be interested in a rather different decision
rule from the dominance principle that features in Joyce’s argument.
2 Categorical doxastic states
In this part of the paper, we are concerned with epistemic norms that govern categorical
doxastic states. I take there to be three types of such states: full belief, full disbelief, and
suspension of judgement. Thus, we model an agent’s categorical doxastic states at a given
time by her belief function b, which takes each proposition X that she entertains and returns
B if she believes X, D if she disbelieves X, and S if she suspends judgment on X. Let F be
the set of propositions that the agent entertains. Then b : F → {B, D, S}.
In James’ terminology, F is the set of “live hypotheses”. And the agent then has, for each
proposition X in F , a “forced choice” between believing, disbelieving, and suspending on
X. James writes: “to say [...] ‘Do not decide but leave the question open,’ is itself a passional
decision, just like deciding ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ and is attended with the same risk of losing the
truth” (James, 1896, 334).
Our question is this: Which belief functions are rational for which agents? To answer it
using epistemic utility theory, we first need to answer two subsidiary questions: How should
we measure the epistemic utility of a belief function? What decision principles should guide
our choice of belief function in the presence of that measure of epistemic utility? Recall
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William James’ two commandments — Believe truth! Shun error! How we weigh the relative
importance of one against the other determines how we manage our epistemic life. In fact,
it turns out that the answers to both of our subsidiary questions — the question of which
measure of epistemic utility to use and the question of which decision principle to adopt —
will be affected by the relative importance we ascribe to James’ two imperatives.
2.1 Jamesian measures of epistemic utility
First, the measure of epistemic utility. In fact, in this paper, as in Joyce’s, it will be most
convenient to talk about measures of epistemic disutility. But such measures are easily ob-
tained from measures of epistemic utility: the negative of an epistemic utility function is
an epistemic disutility function; and vice versa. James’ two commandments suggest a veri-
tistic or accuracy-based account of epistemic utility. That is, it seems reasonable to interpret
James as taking the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility to be the having of accurate
belief states — Believe truth! — and the not having of inaccurate ones — Shun error!. This
suggests that the epistemic disutility of a belief function b at a world w is determined as
follows.1 First, there is a local inaccuracy measure s : {0, 1} × {B, D, S} → [0,∞]. The idea is
this: s(1, B) gives the inaccuracy of having a belief in a true proposition, while s(0, B) gives
the inaccuracy of having a belief in a false proposition. Similarly, s(1, S) gives the inaccu-
racy of suspending judgment in a proposition that’s true, and s(0, S) gives the inaccuracy
of suspending in a proposition that’s false. And again s(1, D) gives the inaccuracy of disbe-
lieving a truth, while s(0, D) gives the inaccuracy of disbelieving a falsehood. We make the
following assumptions:
• s(1, B) = s(0, D). That is, a false disbelief is as inaccurate as a true belief. We denote
this −R, where R > 0. ‘R’ for getting it right.
• s(1, D) = s(0, B). That is, a false belief is as inaccurate as a true disbelief. We denote
this W, where W > 0. ‘W’ for getting it wrong.
• s(1, S) = s(0, S) = 0. That is, a suspension of judgment always has inaccuracy 0,
regardless of the truth or falsity of the proposition.
Now we can use our local inaccuracy measure s to define a global inaccuracy measure I for
categorical doxastic states. This takes an entire belief function b defined on F and a possible
world w and returns a measure of the inaccuracy of b at w:
I(b, w) = ∑
X∈F
s(vw(X), b(X))
1Many consequences of measuring the epistemic utility of beliefs and disbeliefs in this way have been ex-
plored by Hempel (1962), Levi (1967), Easwaran (ms), Easwaran and Fitelson (ta), and Fitelson (ms). This section
complements that work by explaining the consequences of a risk-sensitive decision principle in the presence of
this account of epistemic utility.
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where vw(X) = 1 if X is true and vw(X) = 0 if X is false. That is, the inaccuracy of a
belief function is simply the sum of the inaccuracies of the individual categorical attitudes
that comprise it. Thus, a belief function that assigns belief (B) to X and disbelief (D) to X,
evaluated at a world at which X is true will have global inaccuracy s(1, B) + s(0, D) = −2R.
Thus, a global inaccuracy measure is determined by a local inaccuracy measure; and
a local inaccuracy measure is determined by the badness we assign to a true belief/false
disbelief — that is, the value of R — and the badness we assign to a true disbelief/false
belief — that is, the value of W. It is in this latter endeavour that we might think the balance
between James’ commandments makes a difference. If we “regard the chase for truth as
paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary”, then we will take R to be greater than
W; if, on the other hand, we “treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth
take its chance”, then we will take W to exceed R. And of course it’s also possible to weight
them equally and let W = R. Depending on what we choose in this case, quite different
epistemic norms follow from decision-theoretic principles.
For instance, consider the dominance principle to which Joyce appeals in his argument
for probabilism. And consider an agent who entertains only two propositions, X and its
negation X. If R ≥ W, then the belief functions that are not accuracy dominated are these:
believe X and disbelieve X; believe X and disbelieve X; believe X and believe X; disbelieve
X and disbelieve X. That is, if we weigh Believe truth! more highly than Shun error!, then
believing each of a pair of mutually inconsistent propositions is not ruled out as irrational
by the dominance principle (nor is disbelieving both).2 On the other hand, if W > R, then
the belief functions that are not accuracy dominated are these: believe X and disbelieve
X; believe X and disbelieve X; suspend judgment on X and X. That is, if we weigh Shun
error! more highly than Believe truth!, then believing each of a pair of mutually inconsistent
propositions is ruled out as irrational by the dominance principle (as is disbelieving each of
them).
2.2 Jamesian decision principles
This gives us a taste of the consequences of different weightings of James’ two imperatives
when it comes to measuring the epistemic disutility of a categorical doxastic state. But these
weightings do not only affect the way in which we measure epistemic disutility. They also
affect the decision principle that we use in conjunction with that measure of epistemic disu-
tility to assess the rationality of categorical doxastic states. After all, James’ two command-
ments each encode opposite attitudes to epistemic risk. To believe or disbelieve a proposition
gives you a shot at maximal epistemic utility (that is, minimal inaccuracy), however you set
R and W: you will receive maximal epistemic utility if what you believe turns out to be true,
or if what you disbelieve turns out to be false. But of course it also opens you up to the pos-
2Due to this counterintuitive consequence of R ≥W, Easwaran and Fitelson (ta) simply assume that W > R.
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sibility of minimal epistemic utility (that is, maximal inaccuracy): you will receive minimal
epistemic utility if what you believe turns out to be false, or what you disbelieve turns out to
be true. Suspension, on the other hand, does not give you a shot at maximal epistemic utility,
but nor does it open you up to the possibility of minimal epistemic utility. Thus, believing
and disbelieving are risky doxastic attitudes in a way that suspending is not.
In ‘The Will to Believe’, James seems more concerned with this reading of his competing
commandments than with the reading explicated in §2.1 above. Thus, he talks of suspending
judgement as being “attended with the [...] risk of losing the truth” (James, 1896, 334) and
the “awful risk of believing lies” (James, 1896, 338). However, at other points, where he also
uses the language of risk, he is clearly imagining that this will be spelled out in terms of
epistemic utility, such as when he writes: “worse things than being duped may happen to a
man in this world” (James, 1896, 339).
We know from practical decision theory that there are two ways that we might encode an
agent’s sensitivity to risk. We might try to build some of the agent’s attitudes to risk into her
utility function; or we might capture it in the decision principle that she endorses (Buchak,
2014). For instance, in practical decision theory, we might represent a risk-averse agent as
assigning diminishing marginal utility to money: that is, we might say that her utility for an
outcome is a concave function of the money she will receive in that outcome. But we might
also take her to endorse a risk-averse decision principle. Such principles include: Minimax,
which says that an agent should act to minimise her worst-case disutility; Minimax Regret,
which says that an agent should act to minimise her worst-case regret; and certain versions
of the Hurwicz Criterion, which takes the weighted sum of the best-case disutility of an op-
tion and its worst-case disutility and says that an agent should minimise that. In section 2.1,
we saw how we might encode an agent’s attitudes to epistemic risk into her epistemic utility
function: a risk-averse agent, who weighs Believe truth! more heavily than Shun error!, will
assign a greater penalty to being wrong — believing a falsehood or disbelieving a truth —
than she will assign a reward to being right — believing a truth or disbelieving a falsehood.
A risk-seeking agent, who weighs the commandments in the opposite way, will do the op-
posite. In this section, we are interested in encoding those attitudes in a decision principle.
The natural choice is the Hurwicz Criterion, since that allows us to weigh two competing
attitudes to risk differently; and, as we will see below, those two attitudes correspond to
James’ two commandments.
Let us begin by stating the Hurwicz Criterion as a decision principle for general decision
theory — that is, decision theory in which we make no assumptions about the nature of
the options between which the agent is choosing. We will then adapt it to give a decision
principle for epistemic utility theory, and we will describe the epistemic norm that we derive
from it in conjunction with our account of epistemic utility from section 2.1.
Suppose O is a set of options andW is the set of possible worlds. Now suppose that U is
5
a utility function that takes each option and each possible world and returns the utility of the
outcome of choosing that option in that world. Thus −U is a disutility function. Then, as I
said above, the Hurwicz Criterion asks an agent to minimise a weighted sum of the best-case
disutility of an option and its worst-case disutility. Thus, different versions of the Hurwicz
Criterion are given by different choices of weight. Let 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then, for any option o in
O, define
H−Uλ (o) := λ minw∈W
−U(o, w) + (1− λ)max
w∈W
−U(o, w)
So λ is the weight assigned to the best-case scenario; the scenario in which the disutility of
the option is minimal. Then:
Hurwiczλ Criterion Suppose o, o∗ ∈ O. H−Uλ (o∗) < H−Uλ (o)⇒ o is irrational for
an agent with utility function U.
That is, all options o for which H−Uλ (o) is not minimal are ruled irrational. Thus, suppose our
agent is faced with the following decision problem, where the numbers in the table represent
the disutility of the relevant outcomes:
Rain No Rain
Umbrella 10 6
No Umbrella 12 0
Then
• Hλ(Umbrella) = 6λ+ 10(1− λ) = 10− 4λ
• Hλ(No Umbrella) = 0λ+ 12(1− λ) = 12− 12λ
Thus, for λ < 14 , Umbrella is the rational option; for λ =
1
4 , both are rationally permitted; and
for λ > 14 , No Umbrella is the rational option. Thus, as λ increases and more weight is given
to the best-case situation, the agent becomes more risk-seeking and less risk-averse.
Now suppose that I is a global inaccuracy measure — that is, an epistemic disutility
function for belief functions. Then, for a belief function b,
HIλ(b) := λ minw∈W
I(b, w) + (1− λ)max
w∈W
I(b, w)
Again, λ weights the best-case (or minimal) disutility. Then the Hurwiczλ Criterion de-
mands:
Hurwiczλ Criterion (categorical; epistemic) Suppose b and b∗ are belief func-
tions on F . HIλ(b∗) < HIλ(b)⇒ b is irrational for an agent who measures inaccu-
racy using I.
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Thus, λ represents the weight given to the Jamesian commandment Believe truth!, since that
is the risk-seeking commandment, which enjoins us to try to be accurate even though doing
so inevitably exposes us to the risk of being inaccurate. On the other hand, 1− λ represents
the weight given to Shun error!, since that is the risk-averse commandment, which enjoins us
to avoid exposing ourselves to the risk of inaccuracy, even if it is only by doing so that we
open ourselves to the possibility of accuracy.
Now, suppose I is determined by the local inaccuracy measure s, and that s is in turn
determined by R and W. Then our question is this: What epistemic norm follows from
Hurwiczλ Criterion when it is applied to I? To state the norm, we first define what it means
to be a Hurwiczλ belief function. It turns out that these belief functions are precisely those
permitted by Hurwiczλ Criterion (categorical; epistemic).
Suppose we are considering belief functions defined on an algebra of propositions F .
Our first job is to say when a probability function defined on F probabilifies a belief function
on F relative to R and W. There are three cases that we must consider: W > R, W = R,
W < R. Let’s take them in turn:
Definition 1 (p probabilifies b) Let p be a probability function defined on F .
(i) Suppose W > R. Then p probabilifies b if, for each X in F , one of the following holds:
• WR+W < p(X) and b(X) = B
• WR+W = p(X) and b(X) = B or b(X) = S
• RR+W < p(X) < WR+W and b(X) = S
• p(X) = RR+W and b(X) = D or b(X) = S
• p(X) < RR+W and b(X) = D.
Thus, roughly speaking, p probabilifies b if p and b jointly satisfy the Lockean thesis for belief
with respect to the belief threshold WR+W . That thesis, again roughly, says that an agent believes
X if she assigns sufficiently high probability to X; she disbelieves X if she assigns sufficiently
low probability to X; and otherwise she suspends. On the threshold itself, she has some choice.
Thus, for instance, if F contains only God exists and God does not exist, and R = 1 and
W = 2, then p probabilifies a belief in God exists and disbelief in God does not exist if
p(God exists) ≥ 23 = 22+1 .
(ii) Suppose W = R. Then p probabilities b if, for each X in F , one of the following holds:
• 12 < p(X) and b(X) = B
• 12 = p(X) and b(X) = S or b(X) = D or b(X) = B
• p(X) < 12 and b(X) = D
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(iii) Suppose W < R. Then p probabilifies b if, for each X in F , one of the following holds:
• 12 < p(X) and b(X) = B
• 12 = p(X) and b(X) = D or b(X) = B
• p(X) < 12 and b(X) = D
The crucial result is the following, due to Hempel (1962) and Easwaran (ms):
Theorem 1 p probabilifies b⇔ b has minimal expected epistemic disutility by the lights of p.
That is, p probabilifies b⇔
ExpI(b|p) ≤ ExpI(b′|p)
for all belief functions b′, where ExpI(b|p) := ∑w∈W p(w)I(b, w).
That’s the first stage in our definition of the Hurwiczλ belief functions. In the second stage,
we will define them as the belief functions that are probabilified by a particular sort of prob-
ability function.
Suppose F is a finite algebra. Then letWF = {w1, . . . , wn} be the atoms of that algebra:
one might think of these as the maximally specific possibilities relative to F . Now, for each
1 ≤ k ≤ n, we need to define the kth Hurwiczλ probability function on F . We denote it pλk and
we define it as follows:
Definition 2 (pλk )
(i) Suppose 1n ≤ λ. Then
pλk (wj) :=
{
λ if j = k
1−λ
n−1 if j 6= k




Thus, suppose you are thinking about the colour of my newest tie. You partition the space
of possibilities into three: red, yellow, blue. Thus, you entertain only the propositions in the
algebra generated by the following three possibilities: w1 = Red, w2 = Blue, w3 = Yellow.
And suppose λ = 12 . Then p
λ
1 (Red) = λ =
1












4 . If, on the other hand, λ =
1
3 , then p
λ
1 (Red) = p
λ





As we will see, these probability functions play an equally important role when we turn
to ask what the consequences of the Hurwiczλ Criterion are in the case of credences. Here
is the crucial theorem that states the consequences of the Hurwiczλ Criterion in the case of
categorical doxastic states:
Theorem 2 If b satisfies Hurwiczλ Criterion (categorical; epistemic), then b is probabilified by
pλk for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
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The proof is given in the Appendix. Let’s see this result in action. I ask you to pick a number
from 1 to 9. Let Xk be the proposition that says that you pick k. Thus, I entertain the propo-
sitions X1, . . . , X9.3 Now suppose that R = 1 and W = 3. Thus, when I pick my epistemic
disutility function, I assign three times greater weight to James’ commandment to shun error
than to his commandment to believe truth. Now let us see what happens when we change
the relative weights that I assign to these commandments when I pick the version of the
Hurwicz Criterion that I will apply in the presence of that epistemic disutility function.
First, note that, for any 19 < λ ≤ 1, pλk (Xj) = 1−λ8 < 14 = RR+W (for j 6= k). Thus,
since Hurwiczλ Criterion (categorical; epistemic) demands that I have belief function that
is probabilified by pλk for some 1 ≤ k ≤ 9, and since any such belief function will assign
disbelief to eight out of the nine propositions X1, . . . X9, I must disbelieve eight out of the
nine propositions. What Hurwiczλ Criterion (categorical; epistemic) demands in the case
of the remaining proposition depends on λ. If 34 < λ, then it demands that I believe the
remaining propositions; if λ = 34 , it permits me to believe or suspend; if
1
4 ≤ λ < 34 , it
demands that I suspend; and if λ < 14 , it demands that I disbelieve.
Second, note that, if λ ≤ 19 , then pλk (Xj) = 19 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 9. Thus, since 19 < 14 ,
pλk probabilifies a belief function that assigns disbelief to each of the nine propositions. Of
course, this gives rise to a situation akin to the Lottery Paradox, where we disbelieve each
of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions. Recall that we saw above that,
if R > W, there were inconsistent sets of propositions such that believing each is not accu-
racy dominated. The implications of the Hurwiczλ Criterion (categorical; epistemic) just
sketched show that such attitudes may be permitted even if R < W.
3 Graded doxastic states
In this section, we turn from categorical to graded doxastic states. Thus, instead of repre-
senting an agent by her belief function, we represent her by her credence function. This
is the function that takes each proposition that the agent entertains — that is, James’ “live
hypotheses” — and returns her credence in that proposition, where, by convention, we mea-
sure credence on a continuous scale from the minimal credence of 0 to the maximal credence
of 1. Thus, c : F → [0, 1].
We measure the inaccuracy of a credence function in much the same way that we measure
the inaccuracy of a belief function. Thus, we begin by defining a local inaccuracy measure
s : {0, 1} × [0, 1] → [0,∞]. Thus, for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, s(1, x) measures the inaccuracy of having
credence x in a true proposition, while s(0, x) measures the inaccuracy of having credence
x in a false proposition. And again we define the global inaccuracy measure I by summing
3If we wished to make this more Jamesian, we might let X1, . . . , X9 be eight different theistic hypotheses —
e.g., theosophist, unitarian — and the atheist hypothesis. But it is easier to see what is going on if we keep the
example simple.
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the local inaccuracies given by s:
I(c, w) = ∑
X∈F
s(vw(X), c(X))
3.1 Jamesian measures of epistemic disutility
We are now in a position to ask how our attitudes to the Jamesian commandments might
be reflected in the way that we measure the inaccuracy of credence functions.4 Recall that,
in the case of belief functions, we said that the agent who weighs Believe truth! more heav-
ily than Shun error! will assign a greater reward to getting it right than she will assign a
penalty to getting it wrong. Thus, for such agents — whom we might think of as epistemic
risk-seekers — moving from the neutral position of suspension to a belief introduces the pos-
sibility of penalty and reward, but the potential reward has more goodness than the penalty
has badness. And the opposite is true of agents — whom we might think of epistemic risk-
avoiders — who weighs Shun error! more heavily than Believe truth!. For them, moving from
the neutral position of suspension introduces the possibility of penalty and reward, but the
potential reward has less goodness than the penalty has badness. Translating this to the
credal case, we get the following: an epistemic risk-seeker should have a local inaccuracy
measure where a move away from neutral ground — which we might take to be the point
at which s(1, x) = s(x, 0) — will introduce the possibility of penalty and reward, but the
potential reward — that is, the decrease in inaccuracy if the move is in the right direction —
will have more goodness than the penalty — that is the increase in inaccuracy if the move is
in the wrong direction — will have badness. And the opposite for the epistemic risk-avoider.
More precisely:
• If s is a risk-seeking local inaccuracy measure and x∗ is the neutral point for s — that is,
s(1, x∗) = s(0, x∗) — then, for all x and ε:
– If x > x∗ and x + ε ≤ 1, then
s(1, x)− s(1, x + ε) > s(0, x + ε)− s(0, x)
– If x < x∗ and x− ε ≥ 0, then
s(0, x)− s(0, x− ε) > s(1, x− ε)− s(1, x)
• If s is a risk-avoiding local inaccuracy measure and x∗ is the neutral point for s — that is,
s(1, x∗) = s(0, x∗) — then, for all x and ε:
4See (Joyce, 2009, Section 9) for a related account of how James’ commandments might affect choice of credal
inaccuracy measure.
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– If x > x∗ and x + ε ≤ 1, then
s(1, x)− s(1, x + ε) < s(0, x + ε)− s(0, x)
– If x < x∗ and x− ε ≥ 0, then
s(0, x)− s(0, x− ε) < s(1, x− ε)− s(1, x)
Here is an example of a risk-avoiding local inaccuracy measure. It is called the quadratic
scoring rule and it is defined as follows: q(1, x) = (1− x)2 and q(0, x) = x2. And here is an
example of a risk-seeking local inaccuracy measure. It is called the square root scoring rule
and it is defined as follows: r(1, x) =
√
1− x and r(0, x) = √x.
Recall from above: If R < W — that is, the agent has a risk-averse epistemic utility func-
tion — then only the consistent categorical doxastic states are not dominated, but if R > W
— that is, the agent’s epistemic utility function is risk-seeking — then inconsistent states are
undominated. Similarly, it turns out, the credence functions that are undominated relative
to the inaccuracy measure generated by the quadratic scoring rule are precisely the coherent
ones — that is, the ones that satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus — whereas there
are incoherent credence functions that are undominated relative to the inaccuracy measure
generated by the square root scoring rule. The former fact is a theorem due to de Finetti
(1974) and generalised by Joyce (1998), Predd et al. (2009), and Pettigrew (ms); the latter is
easily seen by considering the credence function that assigns 0 to X and 0 to X.
3.2 Jamesian decision principles
Finally, we turn to the question of decision principles that reflect different attitudes to the
Jamesian commandments. In fact, we have very little work to do here, since the natural
decision principle was introduced above. It is the Hurwicz Criterion. Here is the version
that pertains to credences. Given a global inaccuracy measure I for credence functions —
that is, an epistemic disutility function for those states — let:
HIλ(c) := λ minw∈W
I(c, w) + (1− λ)max
w∈W
I(c, w)
Hurwiczλ Criterion (graded; epistemic) Suppose c and c∗ are credence functions
on F . HIλ(c∗) < HIλ(c) ⇒ c is irrational for an agent who measures inaccuracy
using I.
So our question is: Which credence functions are ruled irrational by the Hurwiczλ Crite-
rion (graded; epistemic) and which are permitted? Suppose the credence functions between
which we are choosing are all defined on a finite algebra F with WF = {w1, . . . , wn}, as
above. Then, under a natural assumption, it turns out to be only the Hurwiczλ probability
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functions on F , defined above, that are permitted (not ruled irrational) by Hurwiczλ Crite-
rion (graded; epistemic). The natural assumption is this: our local inaccuracy measure is
strictly proper.
Definition 3 A local inaccuracy measure s is strictly proper if, for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
ps(1, x) + (1− p)s(0, x)
is uniquely minimised as a function of x at x = p.
That is, s is strictly proper if a given credence p in a proposition X will expect itself to be
the least inaccurate amongst all possible credences in X. A number of epistemic utility the-
orists have made this assumption or something similar (Joyce, 2009; Greaves and Wallace,
2006; Pettigrew, ms). However, it is worth noting that while the quadratic scoring rule q
defined above is strictly proper, the other scoring rule r is not. Nonetheless, if we make
this assumption, we can identify the credence functions permitted by Hurwiczλ Criterion
(graded; epistemic) by appealing to the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Suppose s is strictly proper. Then, if c satisfies Hurwiczλ Criterion (graded; epis-
temic), then c = pλk for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Thus, if we consider again the situation in which I ask you to pick a number from 1 to 9,
and proposition Xi says that you pick number i, then we have the following. If I am very
risk averse and assign λ ≤ 19 , then my credence should be simply the uniform distribution
over the nine possibilities: cλk (Xk) =
1
9 . But, on the other hand, if I am more willing to take
epistemic risks, and I give more weight to the best-case disutility by setting 19 < λ, then
I should plump for one of the possible numbers k (with 1 ≤ k ≤ 9) and have credence λ
that you picked k, while dividing my credences equally over the other eight options, thus
assigning 1−λ8 to each.
4 Conclusion
This concludes our attempt to give a formal account of James’ two commandments and the
different weightings that we might assign to them. Where does it leave us? James’ purpose
in drawing attention to these two commandments was to explain how it might be rational to
go beyond one’s evidence. He wished to rebut W. K. Clifford’s famous claim that “it is wrong
always, everywhere, and for every one to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clif-
ford, 1877). In the absence of evidence favouring one hypothesis over any other, we might
think we are obliged to assign equal credence to each, or to suspend judgement on each,
as demanded by the Principle of Indifference or the Principle of Insufficient Reason. James
wished to show that in fact this is not rationally required. For an agent who weighs Believe
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truth! more heavily than Shun error!, it can be rational to pick a hypothesis from amongst
the set between which our evidence fails to distinguish and assign a doxastic pro-attitude
— beliefs, for instance, or high credences — to that while maintaining neutrality or doxas-
tic anti-attitudes — suspensions or disbeliefs, for instance, or middle to low credences — to
the rest. Our investigation has vindicated James. The formal results presented above show
that, for an agent who endorses risk-seeking versions of the epistemic Hurwicz Criterion, or
risk-seeking epistemic utility functions, exactly such doxastic states are required.
This conclusion has consequences for the debate between theists and atheists, as James
anticipated. But it also has consequences for the debate over scepticism about the external
world. Indeed, it has consequences for any debate with the following structure: there is a
range of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses; the evidence does not tell in favour
of any one over any other; and yet we wish to say that having a strong epistemic attitude in
favour of one of those hypotheses — a belief, for instance, or a high credence — is rationally
permissible. For instance, we wish to say that it is rationally permissible to deny the sceptical
hypothesis and believe that the external world exists, even though the Cartesian demon
argument shows that all the evidence we could ever acquire could not decide between them.
And similarly for debates over scepticism about other minds, about the efficacy of induction,
and so on. These judgments of rational permissibility are vindicated by James’ account,
which we have here made precise. For an epistemic risk-seeker, it is rational to plump for
one hypothesis amongst the range of those available and believe that.
5 Appendix: proofs of Theorems 2 and 3
In this section, I present the proof of Theorem 2. The proof of Theorem 3 is exactly analogous.
We prove Theorem 2 by proving its claim for each of two cases, labelled CASE I and CASE
II below. In CASE I, we consider the case in which 1n < λ. In CASE II, we consider the case
in which λ ≤ 1n .
CASE I First, let us assume that 1n < λ. We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Suppose 1n < λ.
(I) If b is probabilified by pλk , then
ExpI(b|pλk ) = HIλ(b)
(II) If b is not probabilified by pλj for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and I(b, wk) ≤ I(b, wj) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
then
ExpI(b|pλk ) ≤ HIλ(b)
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Proof of Lemma 4(I). Note that, if b is probabilified by pλk , then b achieves minimal inaccuracy














n− 1 maxw∈W I(b, w) + . . . + λ minw∈W I(b, w) + . . . +
1− λ
n− 1 maxw∈W I(b, w)
= (1− λ)max
w∈W
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n− 1 maxw∈W I(b, w)
= (1− λ)max
w∈W




This completes the proof. 2
Now, in order to prove Theorem 2, it suffices to show the following:
(i) If b is probabilified by pλk and b





(ii) If b is probabilified by pλk and b





Proof of (i). First, suppose j = k. So b and b′ are both probabilified by pλk . Then, by Lemma
4(I),
HIλ(b) = ExpI(b|pλk ) = ExpI(b′|pλk ) = HIλ(b′)
since, by Theorem 1, the expected inaccuracy of a belief function is minimal relative to a
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probability function iff that probability function probabilifies it.
Second, suppose j 6= k. Note that pλk is obtained from pλj by a permutation of the worlds
inWF and that there is a belief function that is probabilified by pλk that is obtained from b′
by the same permutation. Then note that HIλ is invariant under such permutations.
Proof of (ii). Suppose I(b, wi) ≤ I(b, wj) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. And suppose b∗ is probabilified
by pλi . Then, by Theorem 1,
ExpI(b
∗|pλi ) < ExpI(b′|pλi )
By Lemma 4(II), we have ExpI(b
′|pλi ) ≤ HIλ(b′). By (i) and Lemma 4(I), we have ExpI(b∗|pλi ) =
HIλ(b





∗|pλi ) < ExpI(b′|pλi ) = HIλ(b′)
CASE II Next, let us assume that 1n ≥ λ. We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5 Suppose λ ≤ 1n .
(I) If b is probabilified by pλk , then
ExpI(b|pλk ) = HIλ(b)
(II) If b is not probabilified by pλj for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n then
ExpI(b|pλk ) ≤ HIλ(b)
Proof of Lemma 5(I). First, note that, if b is probabilified by pλk , then I(b, wi) = I(b, wj), for













= I(b, wi) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n
= λ min
w∈W


































This completes the proof. 2
Using the same arguments as above, we can infer:
(i′) If b is probabilified by pλk and b





(ii′) If b is probabilified by pλk and b





And that completes our proof of Theorem 2. 2
Theorem 3 is proved in exactly the same way, substituting a credal inaccuracy measure
I generated by a strictly proper local inaccuracy measure for the inaccuracy measure over
belief functions used above. Wherever we appeal to Theorem 1 in our proof of Theorem 2,
we appeal to the strict propriety of s in our proof of Theorem 3.
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